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Political resource curse 
A B S T R A C T   
This study re-examines the oil and democracy nexus, which is central to the political resource curse by applying 
the latest democracy dataset, V-DEM, into the analysis in a sample of 100 Developing Countries, over the period 
1935-2014. Our study is a contribution to this taxonomic literature where we improve on previous studies not 
only by employing a novel democratic data source, but also because we use two definitions of oil wealth which 
renders our results more robust, besides delineating the sample into small and large oil endowments and looking 
into the experience of two regions, Latin America and the Middle East. Our analysis highlights nuances in the oil- 
democracy relationship. First, that there is prima facie evidence for a political resource curse if we do not control 
for pre-existing institutions that promote democracy. Second, once we decompose the sample into small and 
large oil endowments, the political resource curse vanishes, and also for Latin America, whilst for oil dependent 
economies in the Middle East and North Africa it still remains. Third, after controlling for pre-existing institu-
tional quality, measured in our case by the rule of law, chances of the political resource curse seem to diminish. 
We also calculate threshold levels for the quality of the rule of law to be at in society before they turn a curse into 
a blessing. The converse is equally true, a deterioration in the quality and pervasiveness of the rule of law will 
cause the political resource curse to reappear, and democratic quality will decline.   
1. Introduction 
Does natural-resource wealth foster or hinder democratic institu-
tional outcomes? Notwithstanding decades of research, the question 
remains unresolved. A growing body of work in both economics and 
political science has pointed to the ‘natural-resource-curse’ thesis.1 The 
debate over the resource curse has focused on why resource-rich coun-
tries tend to grow at a slower rate and perform more poorly in their 
economic growth than resource-poor ones (Sachs and Warner 1995). 
In recent decades, the resource curse literature has shifted attention 
to the association between natural-resource wealth (and in particular, 
oil wealth) and political institutions (democracy). Increasingly oil 
wealth has come to be viewed as strengthening autocracy, and inhibiting 
democratic development in developing countries, beginning with the 
seminal work of Michael Ross (2001, 2015). Other researchers, how-
ever, have questioned the validity of the empirical regularity of this 
outcome (Dunning, 2008; Haber and Menaldo, 2011; Herb 2005; 
O’Connor et al., 2018). Within this group of sceptics, some even find that 
oil wealth promotes democracy (Brückner et al., 2011; Menaldo 2016; 
Wacziarg 2012), while others conclude that oil wealth has no significant 
effect on democracy (Haber and Menaldo 2011; O’Connor et al., 2018). 
Still others find that the effect that oil wealth has on democracy is 
conditional on a host of factors (Brooks and Kurtz 2016; Caselli and 
Tesei 2015; Hendrix 2018; Houle 2018; Masi and Ricciuti 2019) – for 
example, inequality, institutional strength, failures of authoritarian re-
gimes, the structure of oil-industry ownership and even purely temporal 
factors (before versus after a structural break, say in 1980 following the 
second-largest jump in oil prices in 1979. 
The literature also reveals a number of gaps and shortcomings that 
led to ambiguous results – for example, using one single measure of 
democracy (the majority of prior research has made use of the Polity 
index as a proxy for democratic institutions), or employing variables 
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that poorly measure the concept of democracy (Oskarsson and Ottosen 
2010). Another shortcoming of the studies was even more glaring: the 
measurement of oil rents. The data used in most studies measured oil in 
terms of oil dependence, which caused endogeneity problems (Tsui, 
2011). Furthermore, the regression results were weakened by missing 
data – whether in terms of oil or democracy variables (Lall 2016). The 
estimations of the impact of natural resources on democracy were based 
mainly at the cross-sectional level rather than being based on 
within-country variations (Aslaksen, 2010). 
This study engages the aforementioned debate by testing the effects 
of oil wealth on democratic-institution outcomes over a long-time span 
beginning in 1935 and ending in 2014. In particular, we examine the 
relationship between oil and democracy by using a newly released 
democracy-measuring dataset from the Varieties of Democracy project2 
– comprising the categories of electoral, liberal, deliberative, partici-
patory and egalitarian democracy –. As far as we know, all previous 
studies have used either a single measure of democracy (Polity2) or 
different aspects of democracy – such as political constraints, civil lib-
erties and political rights – to examine the relationship between oil and 
democracy. 
Our paper contributes empirically to the scholarly debate over oil 
wealth and democracy in three ways:  
1) Our study investigates the validity of the ‘oil-hinders-democracy’ 
hypothesis. We do this by comparing the effects of both oil abun-
dance – proxied by the quantity of oil and gas extracted in a given 
year multiplied by the per-unit world price divided by population 
(oil and gas value per capita), which is a measure of nature’s bounty 
– and oil dependence – proxied by the share of oil and gas value in 
GDP, which indicates the degree of economic reliance on the oil 
industry relative to other sectors of the economy– on democratic 
institutions individually. Most other studies employ only one defi-
nition of oil wealth. As the economy diversifies (and grows), we 
would expect to see a decline in oil-sector dependence. The growing 
and diversified economy may even decide to conserve its oil stocks, 
leading to a decline in the oil abundance metric. This may moderate 
the political resource curse, as the ‘rentier’ effect has been identified 
to be central to its working (Ross, 2001). After all, the political 
resource curse may be more linked to the economy’s dependence on 
this natural resource, particularly in the context of a ‘staple’ trap 
(Auty, 2001). Alternatively, democratization or autocratic rule may 
be related simply to the magnitude of the nature’s gift per citizen, 
which may indicate the degree to which an autocrat can purchase 
acquiescence from the general public or influential groups. Thus, 
distinguishing between oil abundance and dependence may be 
important, as it allows us to better understand the mechanisms 
leading to the political resource curse. In addition, the relationship 
between oil endowments and institutional development is fraught 
with the problem of reverse causality. Oil endowments may worsen 
institutions, but an excessive reliance on oil revenues to generate 
national income, oil dependence, can emerge in the presence of poor 
political institutions and governance mechanisms; see Brunnsch-
weiler and Bulte (2008) and James (2019). We believe that 
employing System GMM techniques addresses these endogeneity 
issues in the case of oil dependence. The problem of endogeneity 
between institutions and oil abundance would be much more 
limited.  
2) To the best of our knowledge, our study is one of the first that has 
employed a new approach in measuring democracy (i.e. V-DEM 
dataset) in the resource curse literature. V-DEM dataset has sur-
passed the most commonly used democracy datasets (i.e. Polity IV 
and Freedom House) for multiple reasons can be found in Boese 
(2019) and Elff and Ziaja (2018). Some of these is that the Polity IV 
dataset was aimed to capture the de jure institutional framework and 
Freedom House Index (FHI) created to measure civil liberties and 
political rights. It is therefore more of a de facto measure. In contrast, 
V-Dem is placed to a certain degree in between the de facto and de 
jure institutional framework (Boese, 2019). There are important 
differences in measurement scale and aggregation procedure that 
would point to the superiority of V-DEM, including greater variation 
over time, and its utilization of the distinction between the liberal 
and electoral components of democracy. Other reason is that V-DEM 
project was built by numerous of country experts and research as-
sistants from all over the world who have been involved in coding a 
new dataset that capture distinct features of democracy for almost all 
countries since 1900. ‘Most [experts] have lived in their countries of 
expertise for nearly thirty years, and at least 60 percent are nationals of 
that country’ (Lindberg et al., 2014, p. 162). In contrast, Polity IV and 
Freedom House datasets rely on a much smaller number of experts 
who are mainly citizens of the United States (Elff and Ziaja 2018).  
3) Since the effects of oil on democracy may vary in different parts of 
the world, and for greater in-depth understanding, this study splits its 
full sample into two classifications: (a) We have selected two 
regional groups, Middle East and North African (MENA) and Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC); and (b) On another level we 
divide the full sample into two groups according to their oil en-
dowments, countries with large oil endowments and those with 
smaller oil endowments, measured in terms of oil wealth per capita. 
The Middle East has long been regarded as the region with the most 
entrenched autocracies in the world, Latin America has also followed 
a different course in its history of democratic development compared 
to the rest of the developing world (O’Connor et al., 2018). We 
confine our analysis to developing countries, since developed coun-
tries that are oil abundant (such as Norway or the USA) achieved a 
high level of stable and enduring democratic development well 
before the advent of oil revenues, and few would suspect the onset of 
a political resource curse in those countries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines 
the relevant literature review; Section 3 discusses our data and empirical 
methodology; Section 4 reports on and discusses the main empirical 
results; Section 5 provides robustness checks; and, finally, conclusions 
are drawn in Section 6. 
2. Literature review 
Since the end of the twentieth century, the relationship between 
resource wealth – especially oil wealth – and democratic institutions has 
received considerable attention. The existing literature on the effects of 
oil on democracy can be divided into three main branches. 
The first, large branch is consistent with the claim that ‘oil wealth 
impedes democracy and makes autocratic states more durable’. For 
instance, in his path breaking article, Ross (2001) found strong evidence 
that oil wealth – measured by oil, gas and coal exports as a fraction of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – delays democratic development and 
enables authoritarian governments to maintain their rule in a sample of 
113 countries. He also was among the first to consider the causal rela-
tionship between oil wealth and democracy, and he suggested three 
mechanisms to explain the adverse effect of oil wealth on democracy:  
(a) The ‘rentier’ effect: oil-rich governments use oil rents to finance 
public expenditure relative to taxation, thus avoiding democratic 
accountability;  
(b) The ‘repression’ effect: oil wealth enables governments to rule 
through strengthening their internal security forces; 2 Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) is an international research project which 
aims to develop new indicators of democracy in all countries all over the world 
from 1789 to the present. 
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(c) The ‘modernization’ effect: when oil rents delay modernization as 
a social force, and with modernization, particularly education, 
the demand for democracy grows. 
Ross re-examined this hypothesis in his later study (Ross 2009) by 
using a more plausibly exogenous variable of oil wealth measured by oil 
income per capita – and he finds similar results. His main finding has 
been strengthened by a number of cross-country studies. Jensen and 
Wantchekon (2004) find a strong negative correlation between oil 
dependence and levels of democracy in 46 African states. Smith (2004) 
uses a different dependent variable by focusing on regime durability 
instead of the level of democracy. This study examines contrasting 
claims made by scholars of oil and politics that oil wealth either tends to 
undermine regime durability or to enhance it. Smith finds that oil wealth 
is robustly associated with increased regime stability. By using an 
event-history-analysis approach, Ulfelder (2007) confirms that auto-
cratic governments are typically more durable in resource-rich coun-
tries. Tsui (2011) has used a unique dataset that exploits variation in the 
timing and size of oil discoveries to identify the impact of oil wealth on 
democracy; his findings are also associated with discovery timing and 
size. He finds that discovering 100 billion barrels of oil significantly 
decreases a country’s prospects for democratic improvement for three 
decades. He also finds evidence indicating a greater negative impact of 
oil discoveries in countries that experienced major finds early in their 
(post-independence) history than in those countries that did so later. 
Thus, Tsui offers new evidence for the long-term negative effect of 
discovering oil wealth on democracy. More recently, Cassidy (2019) has 
examined the long-run effects of oil wealth on economic and political 
development outcomes by using information on geological basins to 
create an instrument for oil production across countries. Based on 
Instrumental variables estimation for 172 countries from 1966 to 2008, 
he demonstrates that oil production impedes democracy. 
The second branch of the literature (that of the ‘Conditionalists’) is 
associated with the claim that ‘the effect of oil wealth on democracy is 
conditional on a host of factors’. Dunning (2008) suggests that natural 
resources may be associated with either authoritarianism or democracy, 
and conditioning variables influence whether the relationship between 
natural resources and democracy is positive or negative. He finds that a 
positive relationship between natural resources and democracy depends 
on the level of the private-income-inequality variable, based on a panel 
dataset that observes Latin America, the world’s most unequal region, 
since 1960. Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010) follow in Dunning’s 
footsteps. They attempt to explain the different political outcomes that 
have been witnessed in five mineral-rich states of the former Soviet 
Union (Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), 
and they conclude that oil wealth only leads to adverse political out-
comes when the government has an overriding role in the structure of 
oil-industry ownership (public or private). Bhavnani and Lupu (2016) 
show evidence from a natural experiment in Brazil; they argue that the 
effect of natural-resource revenues on democracy is conditioned by the 
quality of institutions, and deduce that the greatest adverse effect of oil 
resources on democratic outcomes is seen when the municipalities of 
Brazil have weak institutions. Brooks and Kurtz (2016) also put forth a 
similar conclusion to Bhavnani and Lupu when they re-examine the 
relationship between oil wealth and political regimes in a panel of 183 
countries. They find that oil wealth is not necessarily a curse and may 
even be a blessing with respect to democratic development. Using data 
on 118 autocratic countries between 1946 and 2004, Houle (2018) finds 
that the negative effect of oil on democracy is conditional on the failure 
of the authoritarian regime in question. In terms of economic-forms 
theory, Aytac et al. (2016) have offered a new explanation for the 
conditional effects of the resource curse by distinguishing between two 
kinds of economies: contract-intensive and clientelist economies. Using 
a two-step robust System GMM estimator for 150 countries from 1973 to 
2000, their results indicate that the negative effect of natural-resource 
dependence on democracy is conditional on the prevailing norm 
governing interactions between economic agents. Specifically, resource 
dependence is detrimental for democracy only in nations with clientelist 
or patronage based economies while the resource curse is avoided in 
nations with contract-intensive economies. Caselli and Tesei (2015) find 
that resource-rent windfalls, which typically occur during 
commodity-price booms, encourage authoritarianism, as measured by 
the Polity scale, in countries that are already autocracies – prompting 
them to move towards greater levels of autocracy, and all the more so 
when the country displayed a relatively low initial degree of autocracy, 
as it provides more resources for dictators. Resource-rent windfalls have 
little impact on countries that are already democracies in this connec-
tion. The findings are robust to a variety of techniques, including GMM 
techniques, as well as commodity classifications. 
The third branch of the literature is consistent with the claim that ‘oil 
wealth does not always impede democracy’. In other words, the second 
branch did not, in its view, find consistent support for the claim that ‘oil 
wealth impedes democracy’. Herb (2005) has examined the claim that 
oil impedes democracy, which was addressed by Ross (2001). He finds 
weak support for the notion that there is a net negative effect of oil 
wealth on democracy. In their important study, which has had a 
powerful impact on the ‘oil-hinders-democracy’ debate, Haber and 
Menaldo (2011) have questioned the conventional wisdom that oil fuels 
authoritarianism. Their study tests whether there is a long-term rela-
tionship between oil wealth and the level of democracy within countries 
over time. Using a unique historical dataset on resource wealth that 
covers up to 168 countries from 1800 to 2006 and applying 
time-series-centric methods that control for country-fixed effects and 
operationalize explicitly specified counterfactuals, they find that the 
association between oil wealth and authoritarianism disappears over the 
long run, and generate results that suggest a resource blessing. Using a 
similar approach, Liou and Musgrave (2013) apply a synthetic controls 
method in a small set of countries, and they find little evidence that a 
resource curse systematically prevents democratization. O’Connor et al. 
(2018) re-evaluate Haber and Menaldo’s findings; the results that they 
end up with lead back to Haber and Menaldo’s conclusion. By analysing 
the effect of oil on democracy in the context of colonization experiences, 
Omgba (2015) examines a large sample of oil-producing countries, and 
his main findings are that contemporaneous levels of democracy in oil 
countries are positively associated with the time elapsed between the 
beginning of oil production and a country’s political independence. In 
general, this branch casts doubt on the existence of a straightforward 
political resource curse. 
Consequently, the literature is inconclusive and, therefore, the pre-
sent study aims to fill the research gap by testing the following research 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. The effect of oil wealth on democratic institutions dif-
fers across geographic regions (i.e., LAC and MENA regions) and de-
pends on the level of oil endowments (i.e., high and low oil endowment). 
Hypothesis 2. The effect of oil wealth on democratic institutions can 
be conditioned by institutional quality (i.e., rule of law). 
3. Data and the empirical model 
3.1. Data 
3.1.1. Sample 
The study examines the relationship between two measures of oil 
wealth and five measures of democracy. The panel data for this study is 
strongly balanced and it includes 100 developing countries for the 
1935–2014 period (based on a five-year moving average) 3 in the full 
sample, but we also separate Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), as 
3 Our choice of the period (1935–2014) is limited by the availability of the 
data on oil wealth from Ross and Mahdavi (2015) dataset. 
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well as Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries from the full 
sample. Supplementary Table S1 provides a list of countries in each 
group. 
3.1.2. Variables 
3.1.2.1. Data on oil wealth. The most commonly used measure in 
empirical studies on the resource curse is resource dependence, which 
reflects the degree to which a country’s economy relies on the resource 
sector (Haber and Menaldo 2011; Ross 2001; Wiens et al., 2014). Other 
studies use a measure of resource abundance, which measures endow-
ment (Al-Ubaydli 2012; Ramsay 2011). However, we distinguish our 
study from much of previous empirical work by employing two mea-
sures of oil wealth (oil abundance and oil dependence) rather than one. 
This will give us a unique insight into the conditions under which nat-
ural resources may block or encourage democracy. 
We also utilize another division of oil abundance into high and low 
oil endowment types. Following Cotet and Tsui (2013), we calculate the 
median of average oil value per capita over the full sample period 
1935–2014 (i.e. the log of oil value per capita is 3.84), and then we 
define the 3.84 value as the threshold level to determine whether an oil 
country has large or small oil endowment. Thus, we divide our sample 
into two groups: small-scale oil endowment and large-scale oil endow-
ment countries based on the 3.84 value as a threshold. More precisely, a 
dummy variable takes a value of one if the country produces more than 
3.84, and it takes a value of zero, otherwise. 
The data on oil and gas value is obtained from the dataset of Ross and 
Mahdavi (2015) ,4 who obtained data from the US Geological Survey, 
the US Energy Information Administration, the World Bank and the BP 
Statistical Review. This dataset provides the best available information 
about the volume and value of oil and natural-gas production in all 
countries from 1935 to 2014. 
Due to the highly skewed nature of the data on resource rents and to 
the presence of zero values in the ‘log’ transformation of oil wealth, we 
enter our regressions in the form of natural log of (1+oil wealth). A 
detailed description is provided in Table S3. 
3.1.2.2. Data on democracy. Researchers typically use the Polity index 
as a proxy for democratic institutions (Haber and Menaldo 2011; Herb 
2005; Tsui 2011), which has several shortcomings as a measurement of 
democracy in terms of political rights and liberties – as identified by 
Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010). One of these is that Polity does not 
consider to what extent the citizenry enjoys civil liberties and political 
rights, focusing mainly on the nature of multi-party electoral processes. 
Fortunately, since 2010, more than 50 scholars have responded with a 
global collaborative effort, known as the Varieties of Democracy 
(V-DEM) dataset, to stringently document the features of democracy for 
201 countries from 1789 to 2017. To test our hypothesis, we draw our 
dependent variables from this unique database (V-DEM, Version 9). In 
this study we used five main indicators of democracy that offer 
distinctive approaches to defining democracy (Coppedge et al., 2015): 
Electoral, Liberal, Deliberative, Participatory and Egalitarian de-
mocracy. It is important to note that each democracy index is based on 
various subcomponents. Supplementary Table S2 A summarizes the 
definitions of the five-outcome variables as defined by V-DEM. All of 
these democracy measures are reported in such a way that assigns values 
between 0 and 1. Larger values indicate a better quality of democracy. 
V-DEM data shows much greater variation and has the advantage of a 
variety of sub-components which are fine grained to capture more as-
pects of democracy. In particular, it separates a liberal component index 
from the electoral democracy index. While elections are common in 
most developing countries respect for liberal values are less common. 
3.1.2.3. Other variables. In order to avoid any potential omitted vari-
able bias, we include other explanatory variables in our core regression 
that have been defined in the literature and are strongly associated with 
democratic institutional development: income per capita (Bolt and van 
Zanden, 2014), the log of population (Bolt and van Zanden, 2014) and 
institutional quality. Following Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Alexeev and 
Conrad (2009), we mainly use the rule of law to proxy institutional 
quality, as it is an important brake on the abuse of power and is believed 
to be important in promoting good quality economic institutions. 
Supplementary Table S3 describes all the variables used in our 
empirical analysis. 
3.2. The empirical model 
We now investigate the effects of oil abundance and oil dependence 
on within-country democratic institutional outcomes. We regress the 
five democracy measures on the two indicators of oil wealth and a series 
of other covariates over the period 1935–2014 in a global sample of 100 
developing countries and to reduce the risk of endogeneity, all explan-
atory variables enter the regressions with a five-year lag. Specifically, 
we estimate the following two models: 
Dit =A1 ​ Di,t− 1 + A2(Oil ​ Abundance)i,t− 1 + A3(GDP ​ pc)i,t− 1
+ A4(Population)i,t− 1 + δi + ωt + μi,t (1)  
Dit =B1 ​ Di,t− 1 + B2(Oil ​ Dependence)i,t− 1 + B3(GDP ​ pc)i,t− 1
+ B4(Population)i,t− 1 + γi + ∂t + εi,t (2)  
Where Di,t denotes one of the democracy measures (Electoral, Liberal, 
Deliberative, Participatory or Egalitarian) for country i at period t. The 
main variable of interest in Eq. (1) is oil abundance (the log of oil value 
per capita) and in Eq. (2) is Oil Dependence (the oil value as share of 
GDP). A2 in Eq. (1) therefore captures the effect of oil abundance on each 
democracy measure and B2 in Eq. (2) therefore captures the effect of oil 
dependence on each democracy measure. δi and γi denote country-fixed 
effects that capture unobservable time-invariant country characteristics. 
ωt and ∂t are time-fixed effects that capture common shocks to de-
mocracy for all countries. The error terms μit and εit capture all other 
omitted factors and are clustered at the country level –hence, they may 
be arbitrarily serially correlated within countries. 
In order to cope with the several problems including endogeneity 
problem, unobserved heterogeneity, autocorrelation, and the dependent 
variable persistence (Aytac et al., 2016; Brooks and Kurtz 2016), we use 
the GMM technique (Arellano and Bover, 1995). Pooled ordinary least 
squares in a dynamic model of panel data is biased and inconsistent. 
Furthermore, GMM is more efficient than two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression because it accounts for heteroscedasticity (Hall, 2007). GMM 
estimators come in two variants: the difference GMM estimators and the 
System GMM estimators. We use the System GMM estimator because it is 
more robust in gauging efficiency gains and reducing finite sample bias. 
Moreover, in all System GMM analyses, we use two-step System GMM 
estimator and apply Windmeijer correction (Windmeijer, 2005), due to 
lower bias and standard errors. It is also more efficient than the one-step 
System GMM estimator because it is more robust to the problem of weak 
instruments. 
As GMM estimators of Arellano and Bover are typically designed for 
panel data sets with large N and small T (Mitze 2012), we take the 
average over five-year intervals (Aslaksen, 2010) in the 1935–2014 
panel (where if t1 = 1935–39, then t2 = 1940–44 etc.). Now as the 
number of periods (t) in our study is seventeen 5-year intervals, System 
GMM estimator is justifiable because it relies on N > T. We therefore 
conduct two statistical tests to check the consistency of our System GMM 
estimator. First, Arrelano-Bond test for serial correlation. Second, the 
4 - https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi 
:10.7910/DVN/ZTPW0Y (Ross and Mahdavi, 2015). 
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Hansen test for instrument validity (over-identification restrictions). 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. General summary statistics 
Appendix Table A1 shows the summary statistics for the variables 
used in the analysis and for the full sample, and for each group indi-
vidually. Column 1 reports the mean and standard deviation for the 
whole sample. In the next two columns, the full sample is classified into 
two groups according to the scale of oil endowment (as measured by oil 
and gas value per capita). In the last three columns, countries are clas-
sified into the two aforementioned regional groups. Panel A of Table A1 
presents the key independent variables: oil value per capita and oil value 
as a share of GDP. Panel B provides descriptive statistics for the five 
dependent variables of democracy. Panel C shows the other variables. 
Panel A indicates that MENA countries are characterized by a greater oil 
abundance - oil value per capita- and oil dependence - oil value as share 
of GDP- than those of other regions. MENA countries tended to be richer 
and depend more on oil. Panel B shows that the average of five de-
mocracy variables improves over time. Remarkably, Panel B demon-
strates that small-scale oil endowed countries are associated with a 
higher mean score in all the democracy indices than the large-scale oil 
endowed countries. Also, it shows that the LAC countries have achieved 
the highest mean score in all the democracy indices. Interestingly, in 
Panel C the LAC countries also have the greatest mean score in rule of 
law. 
Figs 1 and 2 demonstrate how the trends of the five democracy 
measures and the two indicators of oil wealth (oil value per capita and 
oil value as a share of GDP) have evolved over the 1935–2014 period 
across the full sample of 100 countries, and in each of the country 
groups. It appears that oil value per capita began to decrease gradually 
from the 1980s until the mid-to late 1990s when it switches back to an 
increasing trend. 
Moreover, the five democracy measures have generally increased 
over time in all the country groups – with a noticeable surge from the 
1990s onwards. In addition, electoral democracy shows the greatest 
improvement compared with the remaining four democracy measures, 
while participatory democracy has the lowest score in most sub-sample 
groups. 
4.2. System GMM estimation results 
We now begin our empirical investigation of the democratic effects 
Fig. 1. Oil Abundance (Oil value per capita) & the five Democratic Institutions measures. Smoothed trends (1935–2014). Source: Authors’ construction using data 
from V-Dem (2019) and Ross and Mahdavi (2015). 
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of oil abundance and oil dependence. Table (1–5) present the main 
System GMM estimation results. In each table, we categorize the analysis 
per type of oil wealth (abundance/dependence) measure to compare 
their effects on each of the five democratic-institution measures. 
4.2.1. Effect of oil wealth on democracy in the full sample 
Table 1 presents the effects of oil abundance and oil dependence on 
each of the five democracy measures in the full sample. The results 
presented in Column 1–5 of Panel A provide strong evidence that oil 
abundance hampers democracy over time for the full sample. but with 
one exception – the liberal democracy was insignificant, even though, 
the sign remains negative. According to System GMM estimates shown 
in Column 1 of Table 1, a 1% increase in oil value per capita reduces the 
level of electoral democracy by 0.004%. In Columns 2–5 of panel A, the 
same increase in oil value per capita reduces the level of deliberative 
democracy by 0.003%, participatory democracy by 0.005% and egali-
tarian democracy by 0.002%. This trend applies also to oil dependence 
as well (Panel B, Column 1–5). 
This provides prima facie evidence that oil abundance and oil 
dependence impede democracy in the full sample. This result is 
consistent with Andersen and Ross (2013), Cassidy (2019), Fails (2019), 
Hendrix (2018), Ross (2001) and Wigley (2018). 
4.2.2. Conditional effect of oil wealth on democracy: Oil abundance 
context 
Table 2 reports System GMM estimates for the two measures of oil 
wealth in small-scale oil endowed countries. According to System GMM 
estimates (Panel A, Column 1–5), oil abundance does not have any 
significant effect on five democracy measures, and this applies also to oil 
dependence (Panel B, Column 1–5). 
Table 3 presents the effects of oil abundance and oil dependence on 
each of the five democracy measures in large-scale oil endowed coun-
tries. Unlike small-scale oil countries, oil abundance does have a positive 
and significant effect on electoral democracy in large-scale oil producers 
(Panel A, Column 1) while it does not have any significant effect on the 
rest of the democracy measures. This result is similar to those obtained 
Fig. 2. Oil Dependence & the five Democratic Institutions measures. Smoothed trends (1935–2014). Source: Authors’ construction using data from V-Dem (2019) 
and Ross and Mahdavi (2015). 
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by Brückner et al., 2011, Liou and Musgrave 2013, Menaldo (2016) and 
Wacziarg (2012) who found a convincing evidence that oil wealth is 
good for democracy. For the other measure of oil wealth (oil 
dependence), there is no significant relationship with the five measures 
of democracy (Panel B, Column 1–5). 
The estimates from Table 2 indicate that oil abundance and oil 
Table 1 
The effect of oil wealth on each of the five democratic-institution measures in full Sample: Oil Abundance vs Oil Dependence. Five-year panel 1935–2014.   
Dependent Variables 
Panel (A). Oil Abundance (Oil Value per capita) and Democracy 
Electoral Democracy Liberal Democracy Deliberative Democracy Participatory Democracy Egalitarian Democracy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Oil Abundance (t-1) − 0.004* − 0.003 − 0.003** − 0.005** − 0.002*  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.012* 0.012 0.010** 0.014** 0.010**  
(0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Population (t-1) 0.006** 0.007* 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003*  
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)  
Observations 784 784 784 784 784 
No. of countries 100 100 100 100 100 
Hansen J: P-value 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.997 0.999 
AR (2): P-value 0.114 0.714 0.177 0.302 0.0718 
Dependent Variables Panel (B). Oil Dependence (Oil Value as a share of GDP) and Democracy 
Electoral Democracy Liberal Democracy Deliberative Democracy Participatory Democracy Egalitarian Democracy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Oil Dependence (t-1) − 0.013* − 0.019** − 0.010** − 0.013** − 0.008**  
(0.007) (0.010) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.004 0.011 0.006 0.006 0.006  
(0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Population (t-1) 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001  
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)  
Observations 763 763 763 763 763 
No. of countries 100 100 100 100 100 
Hansen J: P-value 0.996 0.997 0.999 0.991 0.996 
AR (2): P-value 0.111 0.759 0.158 0.301 0.0635 
Note. All regressions are two-step system GMM. Two-step robust standard errors, which incorporated the Windmeijer (2005) correction, are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. AR (2) = Arrelano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation. Hansen test = Test of instrument over-identification restrictions. 
Table 2 
The effect of oil wealth on each of the five democratic-institution measures in small oil countries: Oil Abundance vs Oil Dependence. Five-year panel 1935–2014.   
Dependent Variables 
Panel (A). Oil Abundance (Oil Value per capita) and Democracy 
Electoral Democracy Liberal Democracy Deliberative Democracy Participatory Democracy Egalitarian Democracy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Oil Abundance (t-1) − 0.003 − 0.008 − 0.002 − 0.003 − 0.003  
(0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.019) (0.002) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.009 0.018 0.009 0.012 0.017  
(0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.023) (0.018) 
Population (t-1) 0.002 0.011** 0.004** 0.003 0.003  
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.024) (0.003)  
Observations 353 353 353 353 353 
No. of countries 32 32 32 32 32 
Hansen J: P-value 0.127 0.538 0.117 0.130 1 
AR (2): P-value 0.325 0.249 0.785 0.918 0.480 
Dependent Variables Panel (B). Oil Dependence (Oil Value as a share of GDP) and Democracy 
Electoral Democracy Liberal Democracy Deliberative Democracy Participatory Democracy Egalitarian Democracy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Oil Dependence (t-1) − 0.005 − 0.000 0.029 − 0.002 − 0.002  
(0.006) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.002) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.020 0.024 0.004 0.005 0.004  
(0.047) (0.027) (0.018) (0.020) (0.007) 
Population (t-1) 0.003 0.022 0.116 0.004 − 0.000  
(0.009) (0.045) (0.076) (0.011) (0.004)  
Observations 350 350 350 350 350 
No. of countries 32 32 32 32 32 
Hansen J: P-value 1 1 1 1 0.126 
AR (2): P-value 0.622 0.737 0.355 0.957 0.0759 
Note. All regressions are two-step system GMM. Two-step robust standard errors, which incorporated the Windmeijer (2005) correction, are in parentheses. *p < 0.10, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. AR (2) = Arrelano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation. Hansen test = Test of instrument over-identification restrictions. 
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dependence have no effect on electoral, liberal, deliberative, participa-
tory, or egalitarian democracy during the period 1935–2014 for small- 
scale oil endowed countries. This empirical finding supports the view 
put forward by Haber and Menaldo (2011), who suggest that natural 
resources and democracy are unrelated. 
Moreover, after confirming that oil wealth adversely affects 
Table 3 
The effect of oil wealth on each of the five democratic-institution measures in large oil countries: Oil Abundance vs Oil Dependence. Five-year panel 1935–2014.   
Dependent Variables 
Panel (A). Oil Abundance (Oil Value per capita) and Democracy 
Electoral Democracy Liberal Democracy Deliberative Democracy Participatory Democracy Egalitarian Democracy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Oil Abundance (t-1) 0.038* 0.005 0.011 − 0.014 0.001  
(0.021) (0.006) (0.024) (0.018) (0.001) 
GDP per capita (t-1) − 0.107 − 0.007 − 0.029 0.037 0.002  
(0.078) (0.015) (0.068) (0.047) (0.004) 
Population (t-1) 0.023** − 0.001 0.007 − 0.001 0.003*  
(0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.002)  
Observations 373 373 373 373 373 
No. of countries 30 30 30 30 30 
Hansen J: P-value 1 1 1 1 0.578 
AR (2): P-value 0.484 0.238 0.834 0.346 0.427 
Dependent Variables Panel (B). Oil Dependence (Oil Value as a share of GDP) and Democracy 
Electoral Democracy Liberal Democracy Deliberative Democracy Participatory Democracy Egalitarian Democracy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Oil Dependence (t-1) − 0.0075 − 0.011 − 0.003 − 0.004 − 0.004  
(0.0079) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.0001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.008  
(0.0068) (0.016) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
Population (t-1) 0.0038 − 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003  
(0.0031) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
Observations 357 1 357 357 357 
No. of countries 30 0.115 30 30 30 
Hansen J: P-value 0.713 − 0.011 1 1 1 
AR (2): P-value 0.213 (0.012) 0.0835 0.144 0.360 
Note. All regressions are two-step system GMM. Two-step robust standard errors, which incorporated the Windmeijer (2005) correction, are in parentheses. *p < 0.10, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. AR (2) = Arrelano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation. Hansen test = Test of instrument over-identification restrictions. 
Table 4 
The effect of oil wealth on each of the five democratic-institution measures in Latin America and Caribbean Oil Abundance vs Oil Dependence. Five-year panel 
1935–2014.   
Dependent Variables 
Panel (A). Oil Abundance (Oil Value per capita) and Democracy 
Electoral Democracy Liberal Democracy Deliberative Democracy Participatory Democracy Egalitarian Democracy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Oil Abundance (t-1) − 0.036 − 0.016 − 0.008 − 0.003 − 0.001  
(0.024) (0.083) (0.010) (0.007) (0.003) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.263 0.117 0.075 0.023 0.026  
(0.188) (0.591) (0.072) (0.042) (0.023) 
Population (t-1) 0.103 0.040 0.023 0.009 0.003  
(0.069) (0.174) (0.024) (0.012) (0.004)  
Observations 268 268 202 268 268 
No. of countries 22 22 22 22 22 
Hansen J: P-value 0.998 0.988 1 0.990 0.997 
AR (2): P-value 0.424 0.396 0.360 0.821 0.252 
Dependent Variables Panel (B). Oil Dependence (Oil Value as a share of GDP) and Democracy 
Electoral Democracy Liberal Democracy Deliberative Democracy Participatory Democracy Egalitarian Democracy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Oil Dependence (t-1) 0.045 − 0.977 0.164 0.179 − 0.038  
(0.462) (1.380) (0.379) (0.310) (1.124) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.005 1.415*** − 0.214 − 0.102 0.039  
(0.254) (0.054) (0.386) (0.223) (0.847) 
Population (t-1) 0.475 − 1.158 − 0.003 0.085 0.005  
(0.652) (1.729) (0.047) (0.112) (0.093)  
Observations 264 264 264 264 264 
No. of countries 22 22 22 22 22 
Hansen J: P-value 1 1 1 1 0.689 
AR (2): P-value 0.515 0.378 0.723 0.0576 0.200 
Note. All regressions are two-step system GMM. Two-step robust standard errors, which incorporated the Windmeijer (2005) correction, are in parentheses. *p < 0.10, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. AR(2) = Arrelano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation. Hansen test = Test of instrument over-identification restrictions. 
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democracy across the full sample of developing countries (Table 1), it 
seems that this negative effect vanishes when we classify developing 
countries into small and large oil endowed countries. We consistently 
find a positive relationship between “oil abundance” and electoral de-
mocracy in large oil producers, while there is no significant relationship 
in small oil endowed countries. Thus, oil’s effect on democracy depends 
on whether the nation has a large or small oil endowment. Furthermore, 
the estimation results also clearly imply that the effect of oil on de-
mocracy in large-scale oil producers differs along the definition of the 
scale of oil wealth. 
4.2.3. Conditional effect of oil wealth on democracy: Regional context 
To investigate whether geographic location is important in under-
standing the oil–democracy relationship, we break the full sample into 
two regional groups, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA), and present the results in Tables 4 and 5. 
The System GMM estimates reveal that the effect of oil wealth on de-
mocracy in the two regional groups depends on the type of oil wealth 
(abundance/dependence) measures. 
First, unlike for the full sample, oil abundance does not have any 
significant effects on each of the five democracy measures for Middle 
East and North Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean (Panel A of 
Tables 4 and 5). This is in line with existing empirical studies such as 
O’Connor et al. (2018), who find similar results and suggest that oil 
abundance has no effect on democracy in Middle East and North Africa. 
Second, when we measure oil wealth in term of oil dependence (oil value 
as a share of GDP) for LAC countries (Table 4, Panel B) oil dependence 
does not have any significant effect on the five democracy measures. 
For MENA countries (Table 5, Panel B), we find that oil dependence 
has a negative effect on each of the five democracy measures. This 
suggests that oil dependence hinders democracy in MENA countries. 
These results are consistent with Andersen and Aslaksen (2013), 
Aslaksen (2010), Murshed (2018), Ross (2001), Jensen and Wantchekon 
(2004) and Anyanwu and Erhijakpor, 2014. 
Moreover, the insignificant oil-democracy relationship in LAC 
countries are unexpected, since oil wealth in Latin America has tradi-
tionally been considered a blessing in several studies (Ahmadov 2013; 
Dunning 2008; Menaldo 2016). One possible explanation for this un-
expected result is an indirect effect of oil wealth on democracy through 
institutional quality, which points to the need to re-estimate the rela-
tionship by including the interaction term in Equations (1) and (2) 
identified above. 
4.2.4. Conditional effect of oil wealth on democracy: Institutional context 
Next, we investigate whether the relationship between oil wealth 
and democracy is conditional on institutional quality (H2). Nations with 
strong institutions are supposed to have an advantage to benefit from oil 
wealth, whereas countries with weak institutions are subjected to the 
political resource curse (Dunning 2008; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004). 
According to Dunning (2008), the influence of oil wealth on democracy 
can be both direct and indirect. To crystallize the indirect effects of oil 
abundance and oil dependence on democracy via institutional quality, 
the more powerful approach that has been used in primary studies is by 
including an interaction term between the quality of institutions and oil 
wealth. We use the rule of law as our choice for an indicator of insti-
tutional quality, as it serves as a check on autocracy and promotes the 
development of good quality economic institutions. Accordingly, the 
new estimation models are: 
Dit =A1 ​ Di,t− 1 + A2(Oil ​ Abundance)i,t− 1 + A3(Institutional ​ Quality)i,t− 1
+ A4(Oil ​ Abundance*Institutional ​ Quality)i, t− 1 + A5(GDP ​ pc)i,t− 1
+ A6(Population)i,t− 1 + δi + ωt + μi,t
(3)  
Table 5 
The effect of oil wealth on each of the five democratic-institution measures Middle East and North Africa countries: Oil Abundance vs Oil Dependence (1935–2014). 
Five-years average.   
Dependent Variables 
Panel (A). Oil Abundance (Oil Value per capita) and Democracy 
Electoral Democracy Liberal Democracy Deliberative Democracy Participatory Democracy Egalitarian Democracy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Oil Abundance (t-1) − 0.041 − 0.021 − 0.030 − 0.029 − 0.039  
(0.035) (0.017) (0.025) (0.021) (0.035) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.040 0.024 0.024 − 0.010 0.068  
(0.036) (0.021) (0.023) (0.045) (0.062) 
Population (t-1) 0.017 0.015 0.003** − 0.020 0.008  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.001) (0.046) (0.007)  
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 
No. of countries 14 14 14 14 14 
Hansen J: P-value 1 1 1 1 1 
AR (2): P-value 0.390 0.751 0.400 0.544 0.401 
Dependent Variables Panel (B). Oil Dependence (Oil Value as a share of GDP) and Democracy 
Electoral Democracy Liberal Democracy Deliberative Democracy Participatory Democracy Egalitarian Democracy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Oil Dependence (t-1) − 1.590* − 0.433*** − 0.317*** − 0.492*** − 0.212***  
(0.942) (0.077) (0.087) (0.118) (0.044) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.140* 0.069*** − 0.178 − 0.183 0.025***  
(0.084) (0.008) (0.153) (0.149) (0.009) 
Population (t-1) − 0.044 − 0.006 − 0.056 − 0.064 − 0.012***  
(0.027) (0.004) (0.041) (0.042) (0.004)  
Observations 148 148 148 148 148 
No. of countries 14 14 14 14 14 
Hansen J: P-value 1 1 1 1 1 
AR (2): P-value 0.282 0.716 0.694 0.671 0.112 
Note. All regressions are two-step system GMM. Two-step robust standard errors, which incorporated the Windmeijer (2005) correction, are in parentheses. *p < 0.10, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. AR (2) = Arrelano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation. Hansen test = Test of instrument over-identification restrictions. 
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Dit =B1 ​ Di,t− 1 + B2(Oil ​ Dependence)i,t− 1 + B3(Institutional ​ Quality)i,t− 1
+ B4(Oil ​ Dependence*Institutional ​ Quality)i, ​ t− 1 + B5(GDP ​ pc)i,t− 1
+ B6(Population)i,t− 1 + γi + ∂t + εi,t
(4)  
Where rule of law is a proxy to institutional quality, A3 captures the 
effect of the interaction between oil abundance and institutional quality 
on democracy, and B3 captures the effect of the interaction between oil 
dependence and institutional quality on democracy. Fig. 3 describes in 
graphical form the direct and indirect effects (via the institutional- 
strength channel) of oil wealth on the democratic institutions; these 
effects are represented by solid and dashed arrows. 
Tables 6 and 7, report the estimates of the effects of the oil–institu-
tional quality interaction on each of the five democracy measures based 
on the System GMM estimator for oil abundance and dependence 
respectively. The results of the conditional effect turn out to be fairly 
impressive. For the full sample and the four country groups, we observe 
a switch in sign, as the negative effect of oil wealth becomes positive 
when we interact it with institutional quality. 
Estimates for the System GMM models report that, when considering 
oil abundance, the interaction effects of oil wealth and institutional 
quality are positive for the full sample (Table 6, Panel A), small-scale oil 
endowment (Table 6, Panel B), large-scale oil endowment (Table 6, 
Panel C), LAC (Table 6, Panel D) and MENA countries (Table 6, Panel E). 
Turning to oil dependence as a measure of oil wealth, results for the 
system GMM also suggest a positive and significant effect for the full 
sample and the four country groups (Table 7) for almost all of the 
specifications. 
This indicates that institutional quality in form of rule of law 
Fig. 3. Oil wealth and democratic institutions: Direct and Indirect Links. 
Source: Authors. Solid arrow = direct link; dashed arrow = indirect link. 
Table 6 
The effect of oil abundance-institutional quality interaction on each of the five democratic-institution measures. Five-year panel 1935–2014.  
Dependent Variables Electoral Democracy Liberal Democracy Deliberative Democracy Participatory Democracy Egalitarian Democracy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A. Full sample (100 countries) 
Institutional Quality (t-1) 0.081*** 0.047* 0.037*** 0.056*** 0.034***  
(0.019) (0.026) (0.013) (0.019) (0.012) 
Oil Abundance t-1 − 0.006*** − 0.007** − 0.004*** − 0.006*** − 0.008***  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
(Oil Abundance × Institutional Quality) t-1 0.008** 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.010***  
(0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Hansen J: P-value 1 1 1 1 1 
AR (2): P-value 0.904 0.0791 0.0765 0.482 0.0564 
Panel B. Small-scale Oil Endowment (32 countries) 
Institutional Quality (t-1) 0.196*** 0.085 0.066** 0.253*** 0.200***  
(0.067) (0.078) (0.027) (0.063) (0.056) 
Oil Abundance t-1 − 0.026** − 0.025 − 0.015** − 0.019 − 0.023**  
(0.012) (0.017) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009) 
(Oil Abundance × Institutional Quality) t-1 0.041** 0.023 0.023* 0.029 0.043***  
(0.020) (0.029) (0.012) (0.022) (0.016) 
Hansen J: P-value 0.338 0.428 0.574 0.661 0.638 
AR (2): P-value 0.305 0.697 0.751 0.143 0.280 
Panel C. Large-scale Oil Endowment (30 countries) 
Institutional Quality (t-1) − 0.421** − 0.241 − 0.166*** 0.050 − 0.140***  
(0.174) (0.224) (0.056) (0.124) (0.044) 
Oil Abundance t-1 − 0.004 − 0.015 − 0.003 − 0.007 − 0.002  
(0.009) (0.019) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
(Oil Abundance × Institutional Quality) t-1 0.071** 0.088** 0.026*** 0.041** 0.024***  
(0.034) (0.045) (0.008) (0.019) (0.008) 
Hansen J: P-value 1 0.0313 0.998 0.242 1 
AR (2): P-value 0.274 0.657 0.0869 0.196 0.583 
Panel D. Latin America and Caribbean (22 countries) 
Institutional Quality (t-1) − 0.174 − 2.895** − 0.124 − 0.806** − 0.767  
(0.157) (1.140) (0.114) (0.349) (0.551) 
Oil Abundance t-1 − 0.124** − 0.510** − 0.080* − 0.242** − 0.447**  
(0.053) (0.226) (0.043) (0.101) (0.213) 
(Oil Abundance × Institutional Quality) t-1 0.206** 0.371* 0.162** 0.558** 0.634**  
(0.086) (0.193) (0.080) (0.232) (0.309) 
Hansen J: P-value 0.991 1 0.923 1 1 
AR (2): P-value 0.235 0.120 0.965 0.246 0.0940 
Panel E. Middle East and North Africa (14 countries) 
Institutional Quality (t-1) − 0.693* − 0.339*** − 0.145** − 0.313 0.127  
(0.381) (0.096) (0.065) (0.231) (0.115) 
Oil Abundance t-1 − 0.100* − 0.015*** − 0.011** − 0.050* − 0.001  
(0.052) (0.006) (0.005) (0.028) (0.014) 
(Oil Abundance × Institutional Quality) t-1 0.205** 0.030 0.024** 0.080 − 0.015  
(0.089) (0.021) (0.010) (0.052) (0.025) 
Hansen J: P-value 1 0.150 0.874 1 1 
AR (2): P-value 0.857 0.380 0.224 0.408 0.410 
Note. All regressions are two-step system GMM. Two-step robust standard errors, which incorporated the Windmeijer (2005) correction, are in parentheses. *p < 0.10, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. AR(2) = Arrelano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation. Hansen test = Test of instrument over-identification restrictions. 
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mitigates the negative relationship between oil wealth and democracy, 
and it serves to halt the resource curse of an oil endowment. It also 
suggests the vital role of institutional quality when it comes to designing 
policy to enhance oil wealth management and its effect on democracy. 
The results support the claim that the effect of oil abundance and oil 
dependence on democracy is conditional on the quality of institutions. 
This finding is in conformity with Dunning’s (2008) argument, who 
posits that the effect of oil on democracy is conditional on levels of in-
come inequality, and those of Bhavnani and Lupu (2016) and Mehlum 
et al. (2006), for whom the significant factor is the quality of in-
stitutions. Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) also argue that resource-rich 
countries can become democratic only if they choose to strengthen their 
institutions of accountability within the state. Moreover, this outcome 
implies that oil abundance and oil dependence promote democracy in 
indirect ways through strong institutions. 
Nevertheless, to get a better understanding of how a country’s level 
of institutional quality mediates the effect of oil wealth on democratic 
institutions, we compute the conditional marginal effects (CME) of oil 
wealth on democracy by differentiating Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) as follows: 
CME (oil abund)i,t =
∂ democracy
∂ oil abund = Âoil abund + Â4(Institutional Quality)i,t− 1 (5)  
CME (oil depend)i,t =
∂ democracy
∂ oil depend = B̂oil depend + B̂4(Institutional Quality)i,t− 1
(6) 
Eq. (5) represents the conditional marginal effect of oil abundance on 
democracy in Eq. (3), Whilst Eq. (6) represents the conditional marginal 
effect of oil dependence on democracy in Eq. (4). Figs. (4a) -(4e) present 
the estimated conditional marginal effects (solid line) of oil abundance 
on democracy for varying levels of institutional quality that correspond 
to Column 1 of Table 6. Figs. (5a) -(5e) illustrate the conditional mar-
ginal effects (solid line) of oil dependence on democracy at each level of 
institutional quality that correspond to Column 1 of Table 7. The dashed 
red lines around the marginal effects line represent 90 percent confi-
dence intervals and calculated using the Esarey and Sumner’s (2017) 
procedure. 
All marginal effects plots consistently demonstrate the significant 
Table 7 
The effect of oil dependence-institutional quality interaction on each of the five democratic-institution measures. Five-year panel 1935–2014.  
Dependent Variables Electoral Liberal Deliberative Participatory Egalitarian 
Democracy Democracy Democracy Democracy Democracy  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A. Full sample (100 countries) 
Institutional Quality (t-1) 0.258*** 0.048* 0.036** 0.010 0.008  
(0.008) (0.027) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) 
Oil Dependence t-1 − 0.002* − 0.041*** − 0.021*** − 0.021*** − 0.010**  
(0.001) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
(Oil dependence × Institutional Quality) t-1 0.039*** 0.094*** 0.058*** 0.039*** 0.039***  
(0.004) (0.024) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) 
Hansen J: P-value 1 1 1 1 1 
AR (2): P-value 0.123 0.204 0.140 0.102 0.0559 
Panel B. Small-scale Oil Endowment (32 countries) 
Institutional Quality (t-1) 0.851*** 0.092 0.278 0.226*** 0.128*  
(0.171) (0.071) (0.204) (0.060) (0.067) 
Oil Dependence t-1 − 0.269*** − 0.068*** − 0.082 − 0.067 − 0.016  
(0.104) (0.026) (0.062) (0.067) (0.074) 
(Oil dependence × Institutional Quality) t-1 0.827*** 0.160** 0.337 0.186 0.069  
(0.296) (0.075) (0.262) (0.181) (0.182) 
Hansen J: P-value 32 32 32 32 32 
AR (2): P-value 0.146 1 1 0.275 1 
Panel C. Large-scale Oil Endowment (30 countries) 
Institutional Quality (t-1) 0.441** − 0.075 0.014 − 0.069 − 0.064  
(0.207) (0.106) (0.072) (0.058) (0.068) 
Oil Dependence t-1 − 0.129* 0.006 − 0.021 − 0.067** − 0.034  
(0.071) (0.070) (0.048) (0.033) (0.030) 
(Oil dependence × Institutional Quality) t-1 0.726*** − 0.265 0.055 0.251* 0.204  
(0.271) (0.392) (0.279) (0.140) (0.167) 
Hansen J: P-value 0.763 1 1 1 1 
AR (2): P-value 0.124 0.145 0.467 0.0841 0.192 
Panel D. Latin America and Caribbean (22 countries) 
Institutional Quality (t-1) 0.486 − 0.650 − 0.149 0.103 0.843***  
(0.817) (1.849) (0.868) (0.292) (0.251) 
Oil Dependence t-1 − 1.686** − 0.910*** − 1.607* − 1.710** 0.015  
(0.778) (0.337) (0.857) (0.691) (0.075) 
(Oil dependence × Institutional Quality) t-1 2.654* 2.184* 1.829* 2.938** 0.259*  
(1.470) (1.117) (0.998) (1.218) (0.144) 
Hansen J: P-value 1 1 1 1 1 
AR (2): P-value 0.144 0.243 0.104 0.0697 0.365 
Panel E. Middle East and North Africa (14 countries) 
Institutional Quality (t-1) − 0.065** 0.071 − 0.044 0.043 − 0.062**  
(0.029) (0.170) (0.043) (0.047) (0.024) 
Oil Dependence t-1 − 0.056* − 0.313 − 0.020 − 0.020 − 0.040**  
(0.032) (0.225) (0.031) (0.022) (0.018) 
(Oil dependence × Institutional Quality) t-1 0.430** 0.141 0.011 0.141 0.205**  
(0.212) (0.729) (0.162) (0.110) (0.103) 
Hansen J: P-value 1 1 0.814 0.802 1 
AR (2): P-value 0.365 0.775 0.245 0.380 0.402 
Note. All regressions are two-step system GMM. Two-step robust standard errors, which incorporated the Windmeijer (2005) correction, are in parentheses. *p < 0.10, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. AR (2) = Arrelano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation. Hansen test = Test of instrument over-identification restrictions. 
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moderating effect of institutional quality, which serve to increase elec-
toral democracy as oil endowment increases. With higher levels of 
institutional quality, the positive contribution of oil abundance and 
dependence to electoral democracy increase in magnitude. 
In Fig. 4, the final effect of oil abundance on electoral democracy 
depends on the quality of institutions in full sample and in each of the 
four country groups. The contribution of oil abundance on electoral 
democracy becomes positive only when countries reach a certain 
threshold level of institutional quality, higher than about 0.57 for 
analysis of full sample (Fig. 4 (a)), higher than about 0.35 for the 
analysis of small oil endowment (Fig. 4(b)), higher than about 0.38 for 
the analysis of large oil endowment (Fig. 4(c)), higher than about 0.39 
for analysis of LAC (Fig. 4(d)), higher than about 0.62 for analysis of 
MENA countries (Fig. 4(e)). Countries with an institutional quality of 
less than these values, show a negative association between oil abun-
dance and electoral democracy. 
Similarly, Fig. 5 illustrates that, when we consider oil dependence, 
the marginal effect of oil dependence on electoral democracy in full 
sample and in each of the country groups is negative at low values of 
institutional quality, but when institutional quality surpasses roughly 
the values of 0.32 in Fig. 4 (a), 0.29 in Fig. 4 (b), 0.3 in Fig. 4 (c), 0.37 in 
Fig. 4 (d), and 0.49 in Fig. 4 (e) respectively for the full sample, small- 
scale oil endowment, large-scale oil endowment, LAC and MENA 
countries. We begin to see positive marginal effects of rising oil 
dependence on electoral democracy. MENA countries have the highest 
institutional quality threshold levels before oil stops being a curse, hence 
the resource curse is more acute in that region as hypothesized by us 
earlier. 
In that regard, we would like to highlight some important points. 
Overall, when we consider the full sample of developing countries, we 
find a robust evidence supporting oil hinders-democracy hypothesis for 
the both of oil wealth (abundance/dependence) measure. Our results 
provide strong evidence for the conditionality of the political resource 
curse ‘conditionalists view’. Hence, this paper’s findings provide evi-
dence to reassure that oil abundance does not hinder democracy and can 
even be a blessing rather than a curse under the conditionalist view. 
However, a part of our findings diverges from the studies of Anderson 
and Ross 2014; Ahmadov (2013); Aslaksen (2010); Houle (2018); Jen-
sen and Wantchekon (2004); Ross (2001, 2009) and Goldberg et al. 
(2008), which claim that increased oil abundance retards democracy. 
This inconsistency may be attributed to the use of the new V-DEM 
dataset, which was not employed in any of these studies. 
5. Further robustness checks 
In this section we report on several exercises to ensure the robustness 
of our baseline results, we have made several changes – as follows:  
✓ The substitution of the key independent variables;  
✓ The substitution of the dependent variables; and  
✓ Using temporal break of the post-1980 period. 
5.1. Substitution of the key independent variables 
For the data shown in Appendix Table A.2, we use the System GMM 
in order to further test the results. We examine whether the baseline 
results hold when two alternative measures of oil wealth are employed 
as a proxy for oil wealth. The first one is the log of oil value (the quantity 
of oil and gas extracted in a given year multiplied by the per-unit world 
Fig. 4. Conditional marginal effect of oil abundance on electoral democracy at different levels of institutional quality (CMEoil abundance) 
Note: Data are marginal effects based on the System GMM regression presented in Column 1 of Table 6. The 90 percent confidence intervals around the estimates are 
calculated using the Esarey and Sumner’s (2017) procedure. 
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price) from the dataset constructed by Ross and Mahdavi (2015); the 
second is the log of oil income as a share of GDP from the dataset con-
structed by Haber and Menaldo (2011). The results for the alternative 
measures of oil abundance are shown in the first five Columns. While the 
results for the alternative measure of oil dependence are reported in the 
last five Columns. Reassuringly, as we can also see in Table A.2, the 
effects of the alternative indicator of oil abundance and oil dependence 
on each of the five democracy measures in the full sample and for each of 
the country groups are consistent with our baseline estimations – with 
only a couple of exceptions. One of these is found in Panel A, Column 10: 
the negative effect of dependence on egalitarian democracy in the full 
sample has vanished and become insignificant, but the negative signs 
remain. 
5.2. Substitution of the dependent variables 
In Appendix Table A3, we replace the dependent variable with an 
alternative indicator of democracy. In Table A3, democratic institutions 
are measured by the Polity index, which is the most frequently used 
measure. On the one hand, the effects of oil abundance and oil depen-
dence on the alternative measure of democracy (POLITY) in the full 
sample and for each of the country groups (Table A3) are consistent with 
our baseline estimations when we consider electoral democracy 
(Tables 1–5, Column 1). On the other hand, when we consider the 
baseline estimations of liberal democracy (Tables 1–5, Column 2), the 
estimates for POLITY have changed. This is not surprising because as we 
discussed above, POLITY does not capture the nuances of democracy 
that go beyond the multi-party electoral process. 
5.3. Temporal break (Post-1980 period) 
Some studies have argued that the effects of oil wealth on political 
institutions should have differed over time and only appeared post-1973 
period (Haber and Menaldo, 2011), when oil prices experienced a sig-
nificant increase that drove the oil-exporting countries to nationalize the 
assets of foreign-owned oil companies in the 1980s. Andersen and Ross 
(2013) argued that petroleum wealth’s impact on democracy becomes 
negative in the post-break period after the second oil shock (post-1980). 
Based on these studies, we have chosen the post-1980 period as a tem-
poral break to check whether our main results will hold or not. We add 
an interaction term between oil wealth measures (abundance/depend-
ence) and a post-1980 dummy variable, which takes the value 0 for the 
years 1935 to 1980 and 1 for the years 1981–2014. 
Appendix Table (A.4) present the System GMM estimation results in 
order to examine whether the post-1980 period drove our baseline re-
sults. Reassuringly, as we can also see in Columns 1–10 of Table A4, the 
effects of the term interacting oil abundance and oil dependence with 
the post-1980 period on each of the five democracy measures in the full 
sample and for each of the country groups did not undergo any sub-
stantial change in the main results as reported in Tables 1–5, with but a 
couple of exceptions. For instance, the insignificant negative effect of oil 
dependence on deliberative democracy in large oil endowed countries 
becomes statistically significant at 1% level with a negative sign in the 
post-1980 period. 
Fig. 5. Conditional marginal effect of oil dependence on democracy at different of levels of institutional quality (CMEoil dependence) 
Note: Data are marginal effects based on the System GMM regression presented in Column 1 of Table 7. The 90 percent confidence intervals around the estimates are 
calculated using the Esarey and Sumner’s (2017) procedure. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have attempted to re-examine the oil and democracy 
nexus, which is central to the political resource curse by applying the 
latest democracy dataset, VDEM, into the analysis. This data source 
improves upon the shortcomings of previous data sets and allows us to 
delineate between different aspects of democracy. It allows us to 
specially separate the electoral process from the liberal aspect of respect 
for rights and rules. The existence or otherwise of the political resource 
curse is still far from resolved, with some studies indicating its presence, 
others its absence, and still others pointing to conditioning mechanisms. 
Our study is a contribution to this taxonomic literature where we 
improve on previous studies not only by employing a novel democratic 
data source, but also because we use two definitions of oil wealth which 
renders our results more robust, besides delineating the sample into 
small and large oil endowments and looking into the experience of two 
regions, Latin America and the Middle East. We also utilize dynamic 
panel data methods, which allows us to control for endogeneity issues. 
Our results indicate that there is prima facie evidence for a political 
resource curse if we do not control for pre-existing institutions that 
promote democracy. This finding is true in the full sample of both oil 
abundant countries, as well as for nations whose economies are 
dependent on oil for generating national income. But once we decom-
pose the sample into small and large oil endowments, the statistical 
significance of these results almost disappears, and also for Latin 
America. But the political resource curse still remains statistically sig-
nificant for oil dependent economies in the Middle East and North 
Africa. 
Above all, as hypothesized by us, we find strong evidence for support 
of the conditionalist view in the political resource curse literature pio-
neered by Dunning (2008). Once we control for pre-existing institutional 
quality, measured in our case by the rule of law, the political resource 
curse seems not to exist. In particular, we find that the interaction be-
tween the rule of law and our definitions of oil wealth promote de-
mocracy significantly, especially for electoral democracy. The rule of 
law is a powerful check on autocracy and autocratic practices. We also 
calculate threshold levels for the quality of the rule of law to be at in 
society before they turn a curse into a blessing. The converse is equally 
true, a deterioration in the quality and pervasiveness of the rule of law 
will cause the political resource curse to reappear, and democratic 
quality will decline. 
Two other points are noteworthy. The first is to do with the various 
aspects of democracy captured by the V-DEM data. It appears that the 
most significant relationships between oil wealth and democracy lie in 
the sphere of electoral democracy. This may be because democracy is 
quite new to most developing countries, and is feature of the post-Cold 
War wave of democratization. The liberal aspects of democracy could be 
at an earlier stage of development. Secondly, the proposition that oil 
wealth hinders democracy varies across regions as indicated in our hy-
potheses, and is most true of the Middle Eastern and North African re-
gion, and this is in conformity with the stylized facts that suggest the 
prevalence of long-standing autocracies and absolute monarchies in that 
region. 
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Annex A. 
Table A.1 
Descriptive Statistics   
Variable by Panel 
Country by Group 
Full sample (1) Small oil (2) Large oil (3) LAC (4) MENA (5)  
Mean s. d Mean s. d Mean s. d Mean s. d Mean s. d 
Panel A. key Independent Variables 
Oil value per capita (ln) 1935 2.46 2.08 0.11 0.19 3.66 1.38 3.95 1.49 3.43 3.59 
Oil value per capita (ln) 2014 2.94 3.13 3.00 1.88 6.81 1.66 3.31 3.33 5.65 3.35 
Oil value per capita (ln) 1935–2014 2.30 2.85 1.86 1.74 5.20 2.74 2.83 2.81 5.01 3.50 
Oil Value as % of GDP 1935 0.11 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.29 0.22 0.38 0.04 0.09 
Oil Value as % of GDP 2014 0.18 0.53 0.16 0.41 0.45 0.82 0.13 0.36 0.19 0.26 
Oil Value as % of GDP 1935–2014 0.16 0.59 0.14 0.69 0.37 0.71 0.12 0.36 0.25 0.40 
Panel B. Dependent Variables 
Electoral democracy 1935 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.21 0.11 0.12 0.12 
Electoral democracy 2014 0.49 0.22 0.53 0.22 0.43 0.22 0.65 0.20 0.31 0.19 
Electoral democracy 1935–2014 0.27 0.23 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.41 0.26 0.16 0.15 
Liberal democracy 1935 0.28 0.20 0.26 0.19 0.30 0.24 0.31 0.25 0.36 0.22 
Liberal democracy 2014 0.55 0.28 0.60 0.29 0.49 0.28 0.58 0.31 0.56 0.26 
(continued on next page) 
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Table A.1 (continued )  
Variable by Panel 
Country by Group 
Full sample (1) Small oil (2) Large oil (3) LAC (4) MENA (5)  
Mean s. d Mean s. d Mean s. d Mean s. d Mean s. d 
Liberal democracy 1935–2014 0.36 0.27 0.36 0.28 0.35 0.26 0.41 0.30 0.39 0.24 
Participatory democracy 1935 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.03 
Participatory democracy 2014 0.30 0.16 0.33 0.16 0.26 0.17 0.43 0.16 0.17 0.11 
Participatory democracy 1935–2014 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.25 0.18 0.08 0.08 
Deliberative democracy 1935 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.08 
Deliberative democracy 2014 0.37 0.20 0.43 0.20 0.31 0.20 0.51 0.22 0.23 0.16 
Deliberative democracy 1935–2014 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.24 0.12 0.11 
Egalitarian democracy 1935 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 
Egalitarian democracy 2014 0.33 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.28 0.18 0.44 0.20 0.21 0.13 
Egalitarian democracy 1935–2014 0.19 0.16 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.26 0.21 0.14 0.09 
Panel C. Other Independent Variables 
GDP per capita (ln) 7.91 0.86 7.83 0.91 8.49 1.30 8.32 0.72 8.83 1.47 
Population (ln) 15.63 1.49 15.95 1.63 16.04 1.83 15.64 1.57 15.28 1.86 
Rule of law 0.43 0.27 0.47 0.21 0.36 0.22 0.45 0.29 0.36 0.18 
Number of countries 100 32 30 14 22 
Notes: Countries are classified into five groups, two of those groups according to the scale of their oil endowment. To determine whether an oil country has large or 
small oil endowment, we calculate the median of average oil value per capita over the full sample period 1932–2014 (which is 3.84). Sample mean and standard 
deviation are reported for each variable.  
Table A.2 
Oil Wealth and Democracy: Alternative Measures of Oil Abundance and Oil dependence.   
Dependent 
Variables 





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel (A). Full sample (100 countries) 
Oil Abundance 
(t-1) 
− 0.0005*** − 0.0008*** − 0.0004*** − 0.0006*** − 0.0004*** / / / / /  




/ / / / / − 0.139* − 0.118*** − 0.095* − 0.136* − 0.070  
/ / / / / (0.073) (0.020) (0.054) (0.076) (0.050) 
GDP per capita 
(t-1) 
0.0042** 0.0108*** 0.0063*** 0.0075*** 0.0068*** 0.011* 0.015*** 0.009** 0.011* 0.008  
(0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Population  
(t-1) 
0.0045*** 0.0080*** 0.0038*** 0.0044*** 0.0024*** 0.003 0.005*** 0.003* 0.003 0.002  
(0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Observations 790 790 790 790 790 827 827 827 827 827 
No. of 
countries 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Hansen J:  
P-value 
0.0837 0.414 0.131 0.139 0.145 0.996 0.999 0.995 0.995 0.997 
AR (2):  
P-value 
0.117 0.754 0.180 0.310 0.0827 0.0593 0.376 0.109 0.230 0.0479 
Panel (B). Small-Scall oil endowment (32 countries) 
Oil Abundance 
(t-1) 
− 0.0759 − 0.0518 − 0.0699 − 0.0722 − 0.0603 / / / / /  
(0.0668) (0.0984) (0.0471) (0.0603) (0.0493) / / / / / 
Oil dependence 
(t-1) 
/ / / / / 3.944 0.908 − 0.698 − 0.057 0.039  
/ / / / / (10.694) (4.209) (0.715) (0.409) (0.354) 
GDP per capita 
(t-1) 
1.3023* 1.1386 0.6276 0.6463 1.2463** 0.031 0.002 − 0.024 0.003 0.018  
(0.6778) (0.9086) (0.5676) (0.6840) (0.5854) (0.067) (0.018) (.) (0.009) (0.016) 
Population  
(t-1) 
0.5574** 0.5485* 0.3824*** 0.3598 0.2745 0.009 0.007 0.080 0.002 0.004  
(0.2448) (0.3152) (0.1405) (0.2192) (0.2003) (0.030) (0.008) (0.089) (0.004) (0.006) 
Observations 321 321 321 321 321 346 346 377 377 377 
No. of 
countries 
32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Hansen J:  
P-value 
0.945 0.661 0.673 0.881 0.533 1 1 1 1 0.0757 
AR (2):  
P-value 
0.267 0.220 0.760 0.889 0.0447 0.330 0.296 0.420 0.968 0.0702 
Panel (C). Large-Scall oil endowment (30 countries) 
0.0341 0.2290 0.0379 0.0228 0.0227 / / / / / 
(continued on next page) 
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Table A.2 (continued )  
Dependent 
Variables 





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Oil Abundance 
(t-1)  
(0.0786) (0.1733) (0.0404) (0.0631) (0.0287) / / / / / 
Oil dependence 
(t-1) 
/ / / / / − 0.0929 0.472 − 0.011 0.147 − 0.008  
/ / / / / (0.0670) (0.861) (0.032) (0.164) (0.024) 
GDP per capita 
(t-1) 
− 0.3637 − 0.4644 − 0.2780 0.0613 0.0484 0.0115 − 0.055 0.004 − 0.047 0.004  
(0.5325) (1.4196) (0.4065) (0.5731) (0.2848) (0.0135) (0.130) (0.005) (0.042) (0.005) 
Population  
(t-1) 
0.2188 − 0.0989 0.1670 0.2897 0.1248 0.0071 − 0.009 0.003** 0.002 0.003*  
(0.3918) (0.5236) (0.2226) (0.3474) (0.1840) (0.0068) (0.022) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Observations 349 349 349 349 349 355 355 355 355 355 
No. of 
countries 
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Hansen J:  
P-value 
0.157 0.0521 0.0523 0.236 0.400 0.609 1 1 1 1 
AR (2): P-value 0.217 0.226 0.0865 0.143 0.384 0.183 0.749 0.105 0.213 0.405 
Panel (D). Latin America and the Caribbean (22 countries) 
Oil Abundance 
(t-1) 
− 0.1611 0.0372 − 0.0269 − 0.0657 − 0.1033 / / / / /  
(0.1381) (0.2762) (0.0557) (0.0844) (0.1517) / / / / / 
Oil dependence 
(t-1) 
/ / / / / − 2.601 0.055 0.047 2.521 1.708  
/ / / / / (4.597) (0.143) (0.117) (5.067) (1.140) 
GDP per capita 
(t-1) 
8.5468** − 2.0919 0.8001 3.6101 6.2069 0.054 0.032 0.187 0.096 − 0.019  
(3.3410) (8.0964) (3.8320) (.) (4.5795) (0.087) (0.027) (0.407) (0.918) (0.233) 
Population  
(t-1) 
1.3075 − 1.2500 0.0388 0.1958 0.3137 0.016 0.004 0.050 0.333 0.008  
(1.2465) (2.6124) (0.3215) (0.4484) (1.1413) (0.017) (0.003) (0.144) (0.375) (0.035) 
Observations 246 246 246 246 246 298 298 298 298 298 
No. of 
countries 
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Hansen J:  
P-value 
0.938 0.999 0.617 0.384 0.362 0.892 0.387 1 1 1 
AR (2):  
P-value 
0.154 0.813 0.436 0.926 0.556 0.120 0.125 0.805 0.448 0.764 
Panel (E). Middle Eastern and North African (14 countries) 
Oil Abundance 
(t-1) 
− 0.0396 0.0513 − 0.0815 − 0.1408 − 0.1017** / / / / /  
(0.1539) (0.0876) (0.0696) (0.1322) (0.0468) / / / / / 
Oil dependence 
(t-1) 
/ / / / / − 0.433*** − 0.147 − 0.024 − 0.359*** − 0.198***  
/ / / / / (0.090) (0.121) (0.028) (0.119) (0.028) 
GDP per capita 
(t-1) 
0.6483 − 0.1046 1.5611 3.6456 0.9106 0.039 0.033 0.002 0.027 0.039**  
(1.2915) (1.8045) (1.0117) (3.1142) (1.0085) (0.030) (0.024) (0.003) (0.021) (0.016) 
Population  
(t-1) 
1.2789 − 0.8120 1.6220* 2.6961* 0.7306 0.005*** 0.012 0.003** 0.021 − 0.003*  
(1.0454) (1.8334) (0.9842) (1.5847) (0.6133) (0.002) (0.012) (0.001) (0.020) (0.002) 
Observations 148 148 148 148 148 163 163 163 163 163 
No. of 
countries 
14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Hansen J:  
P-value 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.915 1 1 
AR (2):  
P-value 
0.856 0.368 0.0546 0.0262 0.371 0.366 0.631 0.265 0.453 0.717 
Note. All regressions are two-step system GMM. Two-step robust standard errors, which incorporated the Windmeijer (2005) correction, are in parentheses. *p < 0.10, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. AR (2) = Arrelano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation. Hansen test = Test of instrument over-identification restrictions. HM = Haber 
Menaldo 2011 APSR Dataset.  
Table A.3 
Oil Wealth and Democracy: Alternative Measures of Democracy.   
Dependent Variable (POLITY) 
Panel (A). Oil Abundance (Oil Value per capita) and Democracy 
Full Sample Small-Scall oil endowment Large-Scall oil endowment Latin America and the Caribbean Middle Eastern and North African 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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Table A.3 (continued )  
Dependent Variable (POLITY) 
Panel (A). Oil Abundance (Oil Value per capita) and Democracy 
Full Sample Small-Scall oil endowment Large-Scall oil endowment Latin America and the Caribbean Middle Eastern and North African 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Oil Abundance (t-1) − 0.103* − 0.241 0.175** 0.216 − 0.377  
(0.057) (0.277) (0.0682) (1.000) (0.411) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.305*** 1.350 − 0.249* − 0.709 0.226  
(0.064) (1.811) (0.151) (10.511) (0.284) 
Population (t-1) 0.131 0.755 − 0.0173 − 0.734 − 0.086  
(0.119) (1.085) (0.0984) (2.080) (0.110)  
Observations 1,036 343 299 262 143 
No. of countries 100 32 30 22 14 
Hansen J: P-value 1 0.471 1 1 1 
AR (2): P-value 0.801 0.183 0.328 0.279 0.263  
Panel (B). Oil Dependence (Oil Value as a share of GDP) and Democracy  
Full Sample Small-Scall oil endowment Large-Scall oil endowment Latin America and the Caribbean Middle Eastern and North African 
Dependent Variable (POLITY) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Oil Dependence (t-1) − 0.280*** 0.455 − 2.839 2.118 − 1.345  
(0.070) (0.582) (1.918) (7.081) (18.122) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.153** 3.133 3.877 7.266 0.726  
(0.065) (2.160) (2.791) (12.423) (2.503) 
Population (t-1) 0.095** 1.826 12.798 1.632 0.057  
(0.043) (1.306) (8.675) (2.789) (1.585)  
Observations 1,032 341 291 241 128 
No. of countries 100 32 30 22 14 
Hansen J: P-value 1 0.602 1 0.999 1 
AR (2): P-value 0.315 0.732 0.735 0.482 0.769 
Note. All regressions are two-step system GMM. Two-step robust standard errors, which incorporated the Windmeijer (2005) correction, are in parentheses. *p < 0.10, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. AR (2) = Arrelano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation. Hansen test = Test of instrument over-identification restrictions..  
Table A.4 
Oil Wealth and Democracy: Temporal break of post-1980 period   
Dependent 
Variables 





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Panel (A). Full sample (100 countries) 
Oil Abund  
(t-1) x Post- 
1980 
− 0.005*** − 0.005 − 0.004** − 0.006*** − 0.003*** / / / / /  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) / / / / / 
Oil Depend  
(t-1) x Post- 
1980 
/ / / / / − 0.019*** − 0.026** − 0.014*** − 0.017** − 0.010**  
/ / / / / (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) 
GDP per 
capita (t-1) 
0.014** 0.016* 0.010 0.015** 0.011** 0.004 0.011 0.006* 0.007 0.006  
(0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Population  
(t-1) 
0.006** 0.007* 0.004** 0.006** 0.003** 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002  
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Observations 784 784 784 784 784 763 763 763 763 763 
No. of 
countries 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Hansen J:  
P-value 
0.998 0.993 0.998 0.997 0.999 0.998 0.996 0.998 0.994 0.996 
AR (2):  
P-value 
0.112 0.735 0.171 0.307 0.0701 0.103 0.771 0.149 0.294 0.0629 
Panel (B). Small-Scall oil endowment (32 countries) 
Oil Abund  
(t-1) x Post- 
1980 
− 0.004 − 0.004 − 0.001 − 0.003 − 0.005 / / / / /  
(0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) / / / / / 
Oil Depend  
(t-1) x Post- 
1980 
/ / / / / − 0.005 − 0.000 0.024 − 0.003 − 0.002  
/ / / / / (0.006) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.002) 
GDP per 
capita (t-1) 
0.009 0.016 0.008 0.012 0.021 0.019 0.024 0.004 0.005 0.006  
(0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.046) (0.027) (0.018) (0.019) (0.006) 
0.002 0.010** 0.004** 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.022 0.112 0.004 0.001 
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Table A.4 (continued )  
Dependent 
Variables 





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Population  
(t-1)  
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.045) (0.072) (0.011) (0.003) 
Observations 353 353 353 353 353 350 350 350 350 350 
No. of 
countries 
32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Hansen J:  
P-value 
0.123 0.565 0.122 0.128 1 1 1 1 1 0.0847 
AR (2):  
P-value 
0.317 0.239 0.801 0.914 0.640 0.621 0.740 0.348 0.950 0.0503 
Panel (C). Large-Scall oil endowment (30 countries) 
Oil Abund  
(t-1) x Post- 
1980 
0.014* 0.008 − 0.001 − 0.006 − 0.001 / / / / /  
(0.008) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) / / / / / 
Oil Depend  
(t-1) x Post- 
1980 
/ / / / / − 0.0062 − 0.014 − 0.009*** − 0.005 − 0.006*  
/ / / / / (0.0083) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
GDP per 
capita (t-1) 
− 0.077** − 0.009 0.003 0.085 0.005 0.0000 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.005  
(0.036) (0.007) (0.004) (0.096) (0.003) (0.0070) (0.015) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) 
Population  
(t-1) 
− 0.008 − 0.001 0.003 − 0.023 0.003* 0.0040 − 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.002  
(0.009) (0.004) (0.002) (0.034) (0.002) (0.0033) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 373 373 373 373 373 357 357 357 357 357 
No. of 
countries 
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Hansen J:  
P-value 
0.0623 1 0.458 1 0.558 0.703 1 1 1 1 
AR (2):  
P-value 
0.284 0.162 0.103 0.403 0.410 0.215 0.113 0.0921 0.141 0.377 
Panel (D). Latin America and the Caribbean (22 countries) 
Oil Abund  
(t-1) x Post- 
1980 
− 0.014 0.079 − 0.016** − 0.007 − 0.003 / / / / /  
(0.113) (0.060) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) / / / / / 
Oil Depend  
(t-1) x Post- 
1980 
/ / / / / − 0.176 − 0.733 − 0.029 − 0.111** 0.073  
/ / / / / (0.227) (1.186) (0.065) (0.048) (0.148) 
GDP per 
capita (t-1) 
0.331 − 0.708 0.150*** 0.025 0.049** 1.535 − 0.112 − 0.197 − 1.573* 0.047  
(0.690) (0.541) (0.042) (0.018) (0.024) (2.111) (0.267) (0.219) (0.827) (0.171) 
Population  
(t-1) 
0.064 − 0.235 0.023 0.017* 0.003 0.405 − 0.016 0.004 − 0.647** − 0.038  
(0.251) (0.168) (0.015) (0.010) (0.005) (0.579) (0.098) (0.030) (0.312) (0.039) 
Observations 268 268 202 268 268 264 264 264 264 264 
No. of 
countries 
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Hansen J:  
P-value 
1 1 1 1 0.997 1 1 1 1 1 
AR (2):  
P-value 
0.353 0.219 0.145 0.142 0.749 0.777 0.297 0.664 0.273 0.286 
Panel (E). Middle Eastern and North African (14 countries) 
Oil Abund  
(t-1) x Post- 
1980 
− 0.025 − 0.017 − 0.123 − 0.013*** − 0.032 / / / / /  
(0.022) (0.014) (0.153) (0.001) (0.029) / / / / / 
Oil Depend  
(t-1) x Post- 
1980 
/ / / / / − 0.133* − 0.650* − 0.171 − 0.101*** − 0.037***  
/ / / / / (0.076) (0.388) (0.299) (0.012) (0.006) 
GDP per 
capita (t-1) 
0.016 0.024 0.040 − 0.006*** 0.033 − 0.067*** − 0.151* − 0.012 − 0.022*** − 0.005**  
(0.016) (0.015) (0.053) (0.002) (0.022) (0.019) (0.087) (0.030) (0.005) (0.002) 
Population  
(t-1) 
0.021 0.028*** − 0.039 0.000 0.006** − 0.029** − 0.028 − 0.030 − 0.015*** − 0.015***  
(0.016) (0.005) (0.059) (0.002) (0.003) (0.012) (0.024) (0.044) (0.003) (0.002) 
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 148 148 148 148 148 
No. of 
countries 
14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
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Table A.4 (continued )  
Dependent 
Variables 





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Hansen J:  
P-value 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
AR (2):  
P-value 
0.512 0.626 0.489 0.0298 0.830 0.419 0.127 0.842 0.819 0.505 
Note. All regressions are two-step system GMM. Two-step robust standard errors, which incorporated the Windmeijer (2005) correction, are in parentheses. *p < 0.10, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. AR(2) = Arrelano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation. Hansen test = Test of instrument over-identification restrictions.. 
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